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Abstract 
Urban renewal areas are popular but empirically understudied spatial planning instruments 
designed to prevent urban decline and induce renewal. We use a quasi-experimental research 
design to study the effects of 22 renewal areas implemented in Berlin, Germany, to increase 
housing and living quality in the aftermath of the city’s division during the Cold War period. 
Our results suggest that the policy has helped reduce (increase) the number of buildings in 
poor (good) condition by 25% (10%). Property prices increased at an annual rate of 0.4-1.7% 
according to our preferred estimates. Evidence is weak at best, however, for positive housing 
externalities. More generally, our findings indicate that the efficiency of program evaluations 
for place based -policies using quasi-experimental methods increases with the number of 
targeted areas and areas that provide the counterfactual. 
Keywords: Urban, renewal, revitalization, redevelopment, hedonic regression, quasi-
experiment 
JEL: D62, H23, R21, R31 
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1 Introduction 
Among the arguably most striking phenomena in contemporary cities is the simultaneous 
existence of urban decline and gentrification. One way to rationalize these apparently con-
tradictory dynamics is to assume the existence of housing externalities, i.e., mutual quality 
related spillovers among properties in a neighborhood. If housing externalities exist, the 
attractiveness of a location depends on the simultaneous decisions of landlords and 
homeowners regarding the maintenance and upkeep of their properties (Rossi-Hansberg, 
Sarte, & Owens, 2010). As good design and poor maintenance of surrounding buildings 
make an area relatively more or less attractive to different household types and can lead 
to sorting, housing externalities can affect the profitability of investments in the design 
and upkeep of a building. As an example, we may observe a downward spiral in which 
poor maintenance and the flight of affluent households mutually reinforce one another 
and lead to urban decline. In an otherwise similar neighborhood, investments in the build-
ing stock and the attraction of affluent households could become mutually reinforcing and 
lead to gentrification. As with many spatial outcomes, there is a possibility that multiple 
spatial equilibrium configurations exist, and privileged and disadvantaged neighborhoods 
result from a Krugman (1991, 1994) type historical accident. Given the potential for mul-
tiple equilibria and that no economic market exists where housing externalities could be 
traded, it is easy to rationalize government intervention.  
There are numerous sizable programs targeting neighborhoods in need around the world. 
In the U.S. the Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) provides between $3 and $10 
bill. each year to cities and local administrations to improve conditions in low income ur-
ban areas (Brooks & Phillips, 2007). Another example is the Home Investment Partnership 
(HOME) program, which supports affordable housing with approximately $2 bill. per year. 
In Germany, the budget for various urban development programs (“Städtebauforderung”), 
which are typically jointly financed by the federal government and the federal states, 
amounts to approximately €350 ($453.1) mill. to €500 ($647.3) mill. per year (Bundesin-
stitut für Bau-, Stadt-, und Raumforschung (2009)).1 One justification for such public ex-
penditures rests on anticipated positive and self-reinforcing housing externalities, i.e., the 
hope that subsidies for the renovation of a property will benefit others in addition to the 
                                                             
1  Aggregate renewal financing data at the European level are not available. 
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respective owner or landlord. Complementary arguments have been the preservation of 
cultural heritage or an increase in the consumption value of cities that helps to attract high 
skilled workers (Glaeser, Kolko, & Saiz, 2001). 
To date, surprisingly little evidence is available on the impact these policies have on hous-
ing market outcomes. One reason for this lack of evidence might be that separating the 
effects of policies designed to promote housing externalities from other forces that 
(re)shape the structure and attractiveness of cities and neighborhoods is a challenging 
task. For one thing, housing externalities are not tradable goods. As such, it is not possible 
to value them based on observable market prices. One established way of addressing this 
problem is to assume a spatial equilibrium in which housing prices must offset all loca-
tional advantages and disadvantages, including the policy in question (Roback, 1982; 
Rosen, 1974).2 Various policies have been studied based on the associated capitalization 
effects in a long tradition that dates back to Oates (1969) at least.3 Moreover, the task is a 
derivative of the broader problem in the social sciences of separating the effect of treat-
ments form correlated effects. In a spatial context, the challenge is to separate the policy 
effect (the treatment) from a variety of other factors that affect the attractiveness of a loca-
tion, many of which are unobserved. Quasi-experimental methods have recently gained 
popularity as a means to control for unobserved factors that impact house price trends 
(Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos, 2013; Dachis, Duranton, & Turner, 2012; Gibbons & Machin, 2005). 
In this approach, a counterfactual for a group of treated properties (exposed to the policy) 
is established via the comparison of house price trends with a control group. Key to the 
credibility of such approaches is the appropriateness of the identifying assumptions that 
a) the control group itself is unaffected by the treatment and b) the control group in the 
absence of an intervention would have followed exactly the same trend as the treated.  
Our analysis employs such a quasi-experimental research design to identify the effects of 
some substantial urban renewal policy efforts in Berlin, Germany that began in the early 
1990s. The policy was aimed at promoting the recovery of neighborhoods that were found 
to have suffered particularly severely during the long lasting period of division. We follow 
                                                             
2  See Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg (2002) and Ahlfeldt et al (2012) for recent urban equilibrium 
models.  
3  See Celini, Ferreira and Rothstein (2010), Dehring, Depken, & Ward (2008), Brunner, Sonstelie, & 
Thayer (2001), Brunner, and Sonstelie (2003) for a recent examples. 
AHLFELDT, MAENNIG & RICHTER – Urban renewal after the Berlin Wall 4 
the evolution of these neighborhoods over more than two decades, paying particular at-
tention to establishing a valid counterfactual via appropriate control groups and isolating 
policy related housing externalities from other determinants of house prices.  
To our knowledge, we are only the second, after Rossi-Hansberg et al. (2010) [hereafter 
RH], to provide a rigorous evaluation of revitalization policies. RH investigate property 
prices in and around four renewal areas4 and one control area, which was initially consid-
ered but ultimately excluded from the program in Richmond, Virginia to detect housing 
externalities. Their results indicate that housing externalities exist but diminish relatively 
steeply in distance, approximately 50% every 1000 feet (RH 2012, p. 487). Equally im-
portant, they estimate that house prices in the designated areas rose between 2 and 5% 
per year during the renewal period, which equates to a return of 2 to 6 USD per dollar in-
vested. Their results, thus, strongly indicate that urban renewal programs promote posi-
tive housing externalities and might be efficient instruments to increase welfare in neigh-
borhoods in need. Despite the methodological rigor of their analysis, there is an evident 
need for complementary evidence to conclude on the generalizability of the case. This is 
especially true given that RH establish their counterfactual via a singular control area. As 
such, their finding might be sensitive to idiosyncratic characteristics of that area, which 
could influence the counterfactual price trend, but are difficult to anticipate. In short, we 
complement RH’s findings by analyzing a larger policy experiment over a longer period. 
We make use of a relatively large pool of treated areas and potential control areas to ob-
tain credible estimates for the average effect across the treated areas and to evaluate the 
sensitivity of the estimates to the selection of a more limited number of treated and con-
trol areas.  
Berlin offers a unique institutional setting for an analysis of revitalization policies due to 
the 20th century history of the city. For several decades, the former capital of Germany 
suffered from either economic isolation (West Berlin) and loss of market access (Redding 
& Sturm, 2008) or transformation into a non-market economy (East-Berlin), both of which 
severely affected the economic health of the city. After reunification in 1990, the adverse 
economic performance was mirrored by a poor physical condition of the housing stock, 
                                                             
4  Definitions and notation vary. Throughout this article, we will try to stick to the term renewal 
area, however, the terms redevelopment or revitalization area are often used interchangeably. 
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especially so in the eastern part (Berlin, 1992), p. 16). In response to this situation, 22 out 
of 39 originally proposed renewal zones were designated between 1993 and 1995 as tar-
get areas for a renewal program.5 Until late 2009 (the period of the last official report on 
the renewal program), as much as €1.8 Bill. ($2.34 Bill.) had been spent on these areas.  
Our quasi-experimental research design compares property price trends within these 22 
selected conservation areas over the period from 1990 to 2012 to various counterfactuals. 
We consider the runner-up areas (“Untersuchungsgebiete”) not selected for the program 
as a control group for comparison but also make use of other control groups that are close 
to the treated areas either in spatial or socio-economic terms.6 Using these counterfactu-
als, we establish a composite renewal effect, which consists of an increase in the structural 
value of renovated properties and an increase in locational value due to the renovation of 
adjacent properties, i.e., a housing externality. One attractive feature of our data set is an 
indication of a property’s physical condition at the time of transaction. We exploit this 
feature to determine the housing externality effect by exclusively focusing on properties in 
good condition. The rationale is twofold. First, by holding internal quality constant, our 
estimated treatment effects only capture appreciation related to the renovation of sur-
rounding properties, i.e., an (housing) external(ity) effect. Second, we argue that proper-
ties in good condition at the time of the transaction are unlikely to be renovated immedi-
ately following the transaction, and hence that renovation incentives (subsidies and tax 
deductions) do not (or only to a limited extent) capitalize into the transaction prices. We 
complement this approach to measuring housing externalities with an analysis of spatial 
spillovers into areas just outside the treated areas. Previewing our findings, our results 
indicate that the policy led to a significant upgrade of the housing stock and a general ap-
preciation of the properties in targeted areas but not to the pure increase in site value due 
to housing externalities for which one may have hoped.  
In addition to adding important evidence to the sparsely developed literature on the eco-
nomic effects of revitalization policies (e.g. Clay, 1979; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010) and 
housing externalities (e.g. Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos, 2013; Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2010; Koster & 
                                                             
5 The First Berlin Renewal Program (Erstes Gesamtberliner Stadterneuerungsprogramm). 
6  The fragmentation of some of the 39 initial investigation areas results in 22 self-contained zones 
that were treated as well as another 22 zones that remained untreated.  
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Van Ommeren, 2013; Rossi-Hansberg et al., 2010; Schwartz, Ellen, Voicu, & Schill, 2006), 
our analysis connects to a more general research strand in urban economics that examines 
the amenity value of cities (e.g. Albouy, 2009, 2012; Blomquist, Berger, & Hoehn, 1988; 
Gabriel & Rosenthal, 2004; Gyourko & Tracy, 1991; Tabuchi & Yoshida, 2000) or neigh-
borhoods within cities (e.g. Ahlfeldt, 2011; Brueckner, Thisse, & Zenou, 1999; Carlino & 
Coulson, 2004; Cheshire & Sheppard, 1995; Ioannides, 2003).7 This literature has argued 
that there has been a re-orientation towards attractive central cities, especially among 
high-skilled young professionals, the so called creative class (Florida, 2002). The con-
sumption value of cities has therefore become increasingly important for the attraction of 
a highly skilled labor force and, hence, the economic success of cities (Carlino & Saiz, 2008; 
Glaeser et al., 2001). Our findings inform this literature on whether revitalization policies 
and other neighborhood polices such as historic preservation may contribute to the devel-
opment of targeted neighborhoods,8 or whether other factors such as transport affordabil-
ity (LeRoy & Sonstelie, 1983), housing cycles (Brueckner & Rosenthal, 2009) or natural 
amenities (Lee & Lin, 2012) are more important determinants of gentrification. Our re-
sults also complement the analysis by Ahlfeldt et al. (2012), who estimate a general equi-
librium model of simultaneous household and firm location using exogenous variation that 
stems from the rise and fall of the Berlin Wall. Our results provide further evidence that 
the fundamental re-orientation to the pre-WW II equilibrium the city experienced after the 
fall of the Berlin Wall is unlikely to be explained by the renewal policies and likely at-
tributable to economic agglomeration and dispersion forces. Finally, our results inform the 
program evaluation literature more generally in that successful identification of place-
based policy effect using quasi-experimental methods may critically depend on sufficiently 
large number of treatment and control areas. 
                                                             
7  This study complements research examining the effects of spatial density on the productivity of 
workers and firms (e.g. Ahlfeldt et al., 2012; Ahlfeldt & Wendland, 2013; Ciccone, 2002; Ciccone 
& Hall, 1996; Glaeser, Hedi, Jose, & Andrei, 1992; Glaeser & Mare, 2001; Rauch, 1993; Rosenthal 
& Strange, 2001)  
8  A growing body of literature has investigated the capitalization effects of historic designation, 
both on designated buildings and properties near designated buildings (e.g. Asabere, Huffman, & 
Mehdian, 1994; Clark & Herrin, 1997; Coulson & Lahr, 2005; Coulson & Leichenko, 2004; Koster, 
Van Ommeren, & Rietveld, 2012; Lazrak, Nijkamp, Rietveld, & Rouwendal, 2010; Leichenko, 
Coulson, & Listokin, 2001; Listokin, Listokin, & Lahr, 1998; Noonan & Krupka, 2011; Schaeffer & 
Millerick, 1991). 
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The remainder of the article is organized as follows: Section 2 introduces into the institu-
tional setting. Sections 3 and 4 present the empirical strategy and results. The final section 
summarizes our findings and concludes. 
2 Background 
After World War II, the building stock in Berlin was fairly degenerated. Especially in the 
eastern part, which was part of the former German Democratic Republic (GDR), many 
buildings had not or had only been insufficiently renovated until the unification due to 
tight budget constraints. Additionally, private incentives to rebuild housing stock were 
low, as private real estate ownership was not encouraged in the GDR and rents were fro-
zen at a low level since 1945. These developments resulted in an overall poor condition of 
the building substance of original housing stock and inner city district centers, including 
massive vacancies, and an increased need for renovation after unification in 1990. Moreo-
ver, the political mood after the unification of East and West Germany facilitated large 
scale public funding. Among other programs, these developments resulted in the First Ber-
lin Renewal Program.  
The main instrument to overcome these problems was the initiation of a group of urban 
renewal areas, which are eligible for public funding and support according to specific 
rules. The location, shape, and structure of a renewal area are determined in a political 
decision process that involves several steps: First, the districts of Berlin and the Senate 
initiate a search for hotspots of urban decline, the so called ‘investigation areas’, to identify 
potential renewal areas. In depth analyses of the social structure in the respective areas 
are then commissioned, which encompass possible revitalization concepts and recom-
mendations on size and position of the potential renewal areas. Finally, the Senate of Ber-
lin officially designates the renewal areas (Maennig, 2012). 
In July 1992, the Senate of Berlin initiated 39 investigation areas. In 1993, 1994, and 1995, 
22 renewal areas were officially designated, with an overall area of approximately 8.1 
square kilometers, 5,723 plots, and approximately 81,500 dwelling units, with an average 
population of 5,000 residents per renewal area (Senat Berlin, 2001). 9 
                                                             
9  In Richmond, the object of the RH (2012) analysis, the four targeted areas had an average popu-
lation of 1900 residents and on average 1,000 housing units.  
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The Berlin program is characterized by two main phases: In the post-unification phase 
between 1992 and 2002, massive vacancies, and very poor building substance were the 
driving factors of the renewal program. By 2000, already more than 50% of the housing 
units in the renewal areas had been modernized (Berlin, 2005). Private investments in the 
building stock have been supported though tax reductions, loans, cash advances and fur-
ther financial support. In the post-2002 phase, due to the progress made during the post-
unification phase and an increasingly tight public budget, the focus changed: It was set to 
improvements of the social infrastructure and living quality of the neighborhood. Private 
modernizations are no longer co-financed through public investments, but significant tax 
abatements remain as an implicit subsidy.10 
As indicated above, most of the designated renewal areas are located in the former eastern 
part of Berlin. Additionally, the five renewal areas in the former West Berlin are much 
smaller than their eastern counterparts. Only approximately 6% of the housing units in-
side the renewal areas were located in the western part of Berlin, reflecting that West Ber-
lin was in a significantly better economic situation after the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Until 2009, the expenses comprised more than 1.8 billion € (2.3 billion US$) in public in-
vestments, amounting to approximately 880 million € (1.13 billion US$) for modernization 
and reinstatement, and approximately 546 million € (730 million US$) for expenses on 
infrastructure and social environment. The remaining disbursements consist of prepara-
tion costs (€75 mill. / $97 mill.), allowances (€115 mill. / $150 mill.), other regulatory 
measures including compensations (€181 mill. / $235 mill.), and other building measures 
(€63 mill. / $81 mill.).11 On single renewal area level, the average expenses are approxi-
mately 80 million € (102 million US$), translating into per capita expenses of €16,000 
($20,600) distributed over a period of some 15 years. This compares to per area payments 
of $3.5 mill. and per capita expenses of $1,800 in Richmond in a period of four years. Cur-
rently, 19 of the 22 considered renewal areas have been released from their renewal sta-
                                                             
10  Generally, modernization costs for own use or renting can be amortized completely over a 
runtime of 10 to 12 years. For a detailed account of the regulations, compare § 154 and 177 in 
the building law code (BauGB) and § 7h, 10f, and 11a of the income tax law code (EStG). 
11 See (Berlin, 2010), where the local administration (Senatsverwaltung Berlin) provides detailed 
budget accounting information for the different time periods. More up-to-date figures are not yet 
available to the best of our knowledge. 
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tus; Figure 1 in the data section shows the geographic locations of the renewal and inves-
tigation areas in Berlin.12 
3 Empirical Strategy 
While assessing whether significant price trends exist within renewal areas relative to 
other areas is empirically straightforward, separating the causal effects of the policy from 
correlated effects and distinguishing between “internal” and “external” (via the housing 
externality) capitalization effects is more challenging. First, the locations where these poli-
cies operate are not random and likely correlated with specific location characteristics. 
Second, the characteristics, when unobserved, may not only affect the level of property 
prices at a given locality but also the trends they follow. Third, housing quality and espe-
cially exterior housing quality is difficult to observe. Our identification strategy engages 
with these challenges and makes use of housing quality indicators that are typically diffi-
cult to obtain. Before we present our actual empirical specification, we abstract from some 
of the identification issues to introduce the basic nature of the treatment effect we esti-
mate. 
3.1  Identification 
Let us assume we observe a property, the maintenance levels of which are constant within 
a neighborhood and depend on a housing subsidy S. Within a neighborhood, the housing 
subsidy policy is uniform. 
At any given location, the value of a property (P) depends on the maintenance level (I), a 
(housing) externality (E), which depends on the maintenance level in the neighborhood 
and the amenity level (L) of the neighborhood, and the overall macroeconomic conditions 
that are invariant across neighborhoods (Y). For now, we assume that the policy does not 
impact neighborhood quality except through a housing externality: 
    ( ( )  ( ( ))    ) ( 1) 
                                                             
12 See Table A1 in the technical appendix for details on designation date, district, and expiration of 
the renewal areas. An overview of the area is shown is in Figure 1; a snapshot providing more 
detailed graphical information can be found in Figure A1 in the appendix. 
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For simplicity, we assume that the externality is simply the aggregate of individual 
maintenance levels at all locations within the neighborhood, i.e., there is no spatial decay 
within the neighborhood. In a linear neighborhood aligned along one dimension D from 
zero to one, we can then simply write: 
 
 ( )  ∫  ( ) ( )  
 
 
  ( 2) 
Taking the total derivative we can rewrite the price equation as follows: 
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To identify the effect of the policy on property value, we essentially employ the difference-
in-difference methodology that compares the value of properties at different points in 
time (first difference  ) and at different locations (second difference d). We assume that a 
change in policy ∆S only becomes effective in a treatment neighborhood (T), but not in an 
otherwise comparable control neighborhood (C) that is subject to the same macroeconom-
ic shocks (       ).13 
Our treatment effect can be described as follows: 
 
  ( (   )      ((   )   )  ( (   )      (   )   )  ( 5) 
Or:  
 
          ( 6) 
If we assume L to be time invariant at any location, i.e.,  L=0, our treatment effect is de-
fined as follows:  
                                                             
13  In the empirical implementation, we introduce a buffer around the treated areas to ensure that 
the control group is not affected by the treatment through spillover effects.  
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There are important implications for our empirical strategy that aims to estimate  . First, 
as in any quasi-experimental policy evaluation, the treatment effect only reveals the unbi-
ased policy effect operating via I under the assumption that the control group in the ab-
sence of the policy would follow the same trend (       ). An appropriate definition of 
a control group is therefore crucial for the identification. Second, given an appropriately 
defined control group, the difference-in-difference coefficient identifies a composite effect 
determined by the impact of the policy on maintenance levels in the neighborhood 
((    )⁄   ), and the valuation of internal quality (    ⁄ ) and the housing externality 
(    ⁄ ) if the effect of internal housing quality is not held constant in an empirical model. 
Third, to the extent that the interior quality effect can be held constant empirically 
((    ⁄ )    ), the treatment reflects the externality effect caused by the policy (  
cy (  (    )⁄ (    )⁄ ). With the data we have at hand, we are able to hold the interior 
quality effect constant by restricting the transactions sample to properties in good condi-
tion. 
3.2  Renewal Effects 
Baseline specification 
We use a combination of hedonic (Rosen, 1974) and difference-in-difference methods to 
estimate the treatment effect discussed above. Specifically, we aim at estimating a series of 
time specific    parameters, where V indicates the number of years that have passed since 
designation. To estimate these parameters of interest, we estimate the following empirical 
specification: 
 
             (      )   (      )  
 ∑         ∑        ∑ ∑ (        )   ∑     ∑        ,   
( 9) 
AHLFELDT, MAENNIG & RICHTER – Urban renewal after the Berlin Wall 12 
where Pit is the price at which a property i is sold at time t. The central elements of this 
specification are an indicator variable T, which denotes whether a property falls within 
one of the renewal areas we investigate (T=1) or into the control area (T=0), and the func-
tion  (      ), which captures interaction effect of being located within one of the re-
newal areas and the number of years this area has been designated (V). We discuss the 
functional forms we use in depth later in the text after providing a description of and a 
rationale for the control variables used.  
For a number of renewal areas, we observe transactions after their release from designa-
tion status (     ). We control for a potential capitalization effect via the interaction 
term (      ). Xk and Ll are observable property and location characteristics discussed in 
the data section and    and    are the respective implicit prices. We control for otherwise 
unobserved time-invariant location characteristics via a fixed effects    defined for 323 
traffic cells.14 Standard errors (   ) are clustered at the same level. Macroeconomic factors 
that are assumed to be invariant across the treatment and control groups are captured by 
year fixed effects  .  
In addition to controlling for year effects and time-invariant location characteristics, we 
further allow for time-variant implicit prices     for some time-invariant location charac-
teristics    by means of interaction terms with the year effects. The rationale for including 
these variables is that, unlike in real experiments, assignment to treatment and control 
groups is unlikely to be entirely random in a policy experiment, no matter how carefully 
treatment and control groups are matched to each other. If some of the attributes in which 
the treated and non-treated differ experience a change in valuation, this will affect the 
counterfactual. The problem can be remedied by allowing the implicit price of the respec-
tive attribute to vary over time. We attempt to at least address the most obvious candi-
date, the gentrification of central neighborhoods, especially those with an attractive en-
dowment of consumption amenities (Glaeser et al., 2001). We therefore interact the year 
dummies with the distance to the central business district and a kernel smoothed density 
surface of bars, pubs, nightclubs and hotels. We also add a full set of 23 city district   year 
                                                             
14 Traffic Cells (Verkehrszellen) are statistical areas originally used by the local administration to 
analyze traffic. There are 323 traffic cells in Berlin; the average size is 2.7 square kilometers 
(1.05 square miles). 
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fixed effects to capture variation across district-year cells. We note that all the variables 
we interact with the year dummies are time-invariant to avoid problems of circular causa-
tion. 
With the strong controls for time-invariant location features, the flexibility in time-varying 
implicit location attribute prices and a careful match between treated and non-treated 
properties discussed in section 3.3, we hope to establish a sufficiently well-defined coun-
terfactual to benchmark the effect of the treatment over almost two decades. The two 
specifications of the treatment function we use produce treatment estimates that vary in 
the years V since the designation of a renewal area occurred. For a given year since desig-
nation, the treatment estimate then reflects the cumulative effect of the improvement in 
the maintenance condition of a sold property i on the price of i and the external effect of 
the improvements in all other properties j in the same neighborhood as i on the price of i. 
Unlike in the theoretical example, the externality of buildings j and i is discounted by dis-
tance Dij and may include the social externality of new residents moving into upgraded 
buildings: 
 
   
  
  
    
    
 
  
  
∑
    
      
 (   )         ( )         
 ( )    ( 10) 
Treatment functions 
To capture the time-varying treatment effects   , we define two versions of  (      ). 
The first is a relatively restrictive parametric variant designed to allow for a level and a 
trend shift following designation: 
 
 (      )                          ( 11) 
where POST is an indicator variable taking the value of one if a property is sold after the 
respective renewal area has been designated. The year specific treatment effects are de-
fined as            . The second approach follows Ahlfeldt & Kavetsos (2013) and is 
more flexible. We group the treated observations into cohorts depending on Vit. For each 
cohort, we then define an indicator variable VDVit describing whether transactions fall into 
the cohort, e.g., VD1it=1 for all observation transacted one year after designation of the re-
spective renewal area. Interacting all cohort indicator variables with the treatment indica-
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tor T, we estimate a series of difference-in-difference treatment effects that compare how 
prices have changed since designation in the treatment and control groups: 
 
 (      )  ∑   (         )
 
 ( 12) 
The estimated  ̂  coefficients, hence, form a mix-adjusted hedonic price index that flexibly 
reflects the evolution of the treatment group relative to the control group. These two 
treatment functions have distinct strengths. The former allows for a straightforward as-
sessment of whether the policy had a significant impact on levels or trends based on only 
two coefficients that can be estimated with relatively small standard errors. The latter 
approach produces a more flexible time-varying index but also larger confidence bands 
due to the relatively smaller number of observations per VDVit cohort. In addition to em-
ploying these two distinct treatment functions, we vary the model along three more di-
mensions.  
Building quality 
In a first alternation, we only consider buildings in good condition to hold the quality of 
the traded buildings constant (          ⁄   ). Hence the estimated treatment effect 
collapses to   (    )⁄ ∑       ⁄   (   ). We choose to restrict the sample to proper-
ties in good condition (as opposed to poor condition), as it is less likely that these build-
ings are renovated shortly after the transaction. It is therefore also less likely that antici-
pated tax abatements or renovation subsidies are capitalized in the sales price. With this 
approach, we theoretically only capture the effects of improvements in the quality of 
buildings j on the price of a sold building i and, hence, a housing externality promoted by 
the policy. In practice, this approach to separating the internal and the external mainte-
nance effect comes with some limitations. First, our data set offers two binary variables 
denoting whether a property, at the time of the transaction, was in a particularly good or 
poor condition. While this is significantly more information than available in most compa-
rable data sets, this is also evidently far from perfect. Further, we have assumed that there 
are no policy effects on neighborhood quality other than through housing externalities. If 
there are significant direct investments in the quality of local public goods, e.g., the reno-
vation of schools or playgrounds, these location features become a function of the policy. 
Adding these features Qq(S) to the original price equation results in an additional compo-
nent in the treatment effect we measure: 
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As such improvements in Qq(S) are difficult to observe, it is difficult to separate them from 
the housing externalities. We employ an alternative approach to measuring housing exter-
nalities focusing on spillovers into areas just outside renewal areas. This approach, which 
is described next, is closer to RH. It suffers, however, from a similar problem in that it is 
difficult to separate the housing externality spillover effect from an accessibility effect to 
improved local public goods in nearby areas. In practice, this interpretation problem is 
mitigated by the fact that both approaches consistently indicate that the joint neighbor-
hood effect (housing externality and local public goods effect) was fairly limited. Irrespec-
tively of this problem, a significant reduction in the treatment effect when holding building 
quality constant indicates the presence of a significant internal capitalization effect. 
Spillover effects 
One of the advantages of the approach above is that we aim at measuring policy induced 
housing externalities where they are presumably strongest, i.e., within renewal areas. One 
of the problems with this approach, as discussed, is that the information on building 
maintenance we use is imperfect. We therefore employ an alternative approach in which 
we focus on areas just outside the designated renewal areas. While attenuated, housing 
externalities should still be present in these areas. Moreover, any price effect will not be 
confounded with the policy effect on the internal quality of buildings because the respec-
tive areas did not qualify for subsidies. The treatment effect we estimate, hence, depends 
purely on the valuation of the housing externality and the policy effect on the maintenance 
level of buildings j in a nearby renewal area, discounted by distance D: 
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This approach also mitigates another concern, namely, that authorities reserve the right to 
levy the increase in land value generated by the policy (“Ausgleichsabgabe”). Until the end 
of 2011, local authorities generated €68 mill. ($93.3 mill.) in levies. The total expected 
levies estimated by the local administration amount to €211 mill. ($285.3 mill.) based on 
an estimated average increase in land value of €45 ($60.8) per m² (Senatsverwaltung Ber-
lin (2012)), which are strikingly low figures compared to the above mentioned investment 
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volumes.15 While these payments are in practice small, property prices could be negatively 
affected, at least up to the point where the levy has actually been charged.  
To detect spillovers, we alter the definition of the treatment T measure and the control 
groups relative to the benchmark specification (1). In the first alteration, we redefine our 
treatment measure as a binary variable that takes the value of TS1i=1 if a property falls 
within a 500 m buffer area and zero otherwise. We run this specification using the two 
treatment functions introduced above and varying control groups. Focusing on the para-
metric specification and our preferred control group, we then use an alternative treatment 
measure                      , where DISTS is the distance to the nearest renewal 
area.  
Sensitivity analysis and treatment heterogeneity 
The models discussed above produce an average effect of the treatment based on dozens 
of treatment and control areas. This setting has the advantage of being relatively insensi-
tive to idiosyncratic factors that affect trends in individual renewal or control areas, but 
cancel out across areas. We complement the estimation of the average treatment effect 
using a sensitivity analysis in which we replicate our preferred model using randomly 
selected subsamples of treated and control areas. To provide individual estimates by re-
newal area we use a simplified long-difference approach, in which we compare changes in 
mean prices before and 15 years after designation (the average designation time) in the 
treatment and control group of properties near the treated area. We briefly discuss the 
results in the main paper and leave a detailed presentation of the model and the results to 
the technical appendix.  
3.3  Control Groups 
We define a number of control groups (CG) for the benchmark (renewal area) models (CG 
1a-4a) and the spillover models (CG 1b-4b).  
For all control groups, we exclude a 500 m buffer area around the renewal areas, to rule 
out a treatment effect on the control groups due to spillovers. CG 1a includes all observa-
                                                             
15 All income generated through this source is to be reinvested in the district’s infrastructure or 
neighborhood improvements.  
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tions outside the urban renewal areas and the 500 m buffer. In CG 2a, we impose a geo-
graphical limit by considering transactions that lie within a 500 to 2,000 meter (approx. 
6,000 ft.) distance from the renewal areas. CG 3a consists of the fractions of investigation 
areas outside the 500 m buffer that were not transformed into renewal areas – similar to 
RH. As a further alternative, CG 4a is created based on the propensity score matching pro-
cedure proposed by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983). For the spillover models that use the 0-
500 m buffer area around the renewal areas as a treatment group, CG1(b) and CG2(b) are 
defined exactly as before. CG 3b encompasses transactions in investigation areas outside 
the 500 m buffer, plus a 500 meter buffer around the investigation areas. For CG 4b, we 
again use the synthetic matching procedure to find suitable matches to the transactions in 
the buffer around the renewal areas.  
For the synthetic matched control groups (4a and 4b), we match transactions inside and 
outside renewal areas (or buffer areas) based on the propensity score, a likelihood of be-
ing selected for the treatment based on observable characteristics. If transactions that are 
similar in observable characteristics are also similar in unobservable characteristics, the 
resulting control groups will produce a valid counterfactual for the treated. In the estima-
tion of the propensity score, we choose covariates that influence both participation in the 
treatment and the outcome variable. To avoid anticipation effects, only locational varia-
bles that are measured before the treatment or are time invariant are considered 
(Caliendo & Kopeinig, 2008). These covariates include a range of internal property and 
external location characteristics and are discussed in greater detail in the technical ap-
pendix, where we also present some descriptive statistics for the resulting samples. 
3.4  Data and descriptive statistics 
Our study area comprises the area of the Federal State of Berlin, Germany. The city in 
2012 counted some 3.3 mill. inhabitants and approximately 1.9 mill. dwelling units. Ap-
proximately 14% of the population is non-German citizens. While there have recently been 
signs of economic recovery after a relatively long period of economic struggle since unifi-
cation, the unemployment rate has remained relatively high at approximately 13%. The 
overall area is approximately 892 square kilometers (344 square miles). The center is 
densely populated, the overall building structure is a mix of historic buildings (aged ap-
proximately 100-130 years), and buildings constructed after World War II to substitute for 
the destroyed building stock (aged approximately 60 years), and newer buildings. 
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Within this study area, we observe all transactions of developed land that took place be-
tween January 1990 and August 2012, which amounts to approximately 70,000 transac-
tions. The data set includes price, transaction date, location, and a set of parameters de-
scribing building / plot characteristics. The data are obtained from the Committee of Valu-
ation Experts Berlin 2012 (Gutachterausschuss Berlin). The transactions are geo-
referenced (addresses and x/y coordinates), which allows them to be integrated into a 
geographical information system (GIS) environment. The building characteristics include 
floor space, plot area, surface area, age (2nd order polynomial), land use, location within a 
block of houses (e.g., a corner lot), among other variables. Additionally, we merge a set of 
location variables generated in GIS. These include the distance of the transactions to the 
nearest public transport station, school, public park, lake or river, the central business 
district, the nearest listed building, and the nearest main street and the street noise level. 
To control for time-varying implicit prices of proximity to consumption amenities, we 
generate a kernel smoothed density surface based on the 2012 location of bars, coffee 
shops, restaurants, nightclubs and hostels. We use a kernel radius of 2,000 meters and a 
quadratic kernel function (Silverman, 1986). The data are obtained from the open street 
map project, where users submit data to generate a publicly accessible street map.16 While 
these data are not official, but user-generated, they should provide a reasonable approxi-
mation of the actual distribution as long as the reporting probability does not vary sys-
tematically across space. The full list of considered variables is provided in Table A5 in the 
web based appendix.  
From the Berlin Senate Department, we obtained maps showing the exact locations and 
boundaries of the 39 initial investigation areas as well as the fractions that were subse-
quently designated in three waves in 1993, 1994, and 1995. Out of the originally proposed 
39 investigation areas, 17 remained entirely unconsidered in the eventual selection. From 
the remaining 22 areas a total of 69% of the land area entered the program. The fragmen-
tation of some of the 39 initial investigation areas results in 22 self-contained zones that 
were treated as well as another 22 zones that remained untreated. We have digitally pro-
cessed the maps and converted them to a shape file to merge the information with the 
other spatial data in GIS. The 22 renewal areas have a mean size of approximately 0.37 
square kilometers (median 0.35). The investigation areas have an average area of 0.43 
                                                             
16  www.openstreetmap.org 
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square kilometers (median 0.36). As one would expect from the renewal and investigation 
areas having been chosen due to similar building, socio-demographic and geographic 
characteristics, the areas are also relatively similar in other observable characteristics.17 
Figure 1 shows of the spatial distribution of the renewal / investigation areas along with 
our estimated smoothed kernel density surface and one of our synthetic control groups 
(CG 4a). From the figure, some notable stylized facts become evident. First, the majority of 
the renewal (17 out of 22) and investigation areas (31 of 39) are located in the former East 
Berlin, which is not surprising given that the eastern part of the city suffered even more 
severely during the period of division. Second, renewal areas and revitalization areas are 
typically located in central areas and in amenity clusters and, hence, areas that are typical 
candidates for gentrification. It is important to fully acknowledge this spatial pattern, as a 
failure to select sufficiently similar control groups or account for a change in appreciation 
of these characteristics may result in a policy treatment effect that could be confounded 
with a general gentrification phenomenon. Third, our synthetic control groups (red dots) 
consist of transactions that are either close to renewal or investigation areas or in areas of 
high amenity densities, which lends some confidence to the selection process.  
                                                             
17 Table A1 in the web based appendix lists the renewal areas and some stylized facts per area, 
while Table A2 compares key characteristics across the renewal areas, the investigation areas, 
and the rest of Berlin. 
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Fig. 1: Renewal geography 
 
Notes: Notes: Own illustration based on the urban and environmental information system 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006). Crosshatched (hatched) areas indicate re-
newal (investigation) areas. Red crosses are the matched transactions in CG 4a. Smoothly grey 
shaded areas represent the consumption amenity density.  
As discussed above, the information on maintenance condition it is a special feature of our 
property data set. The variables are coded by specialist teams of the Committee of Valua-
tion Experts Berlin, who undertake on-site examinations for each transaction of developed 
land that takes place. In Figure 2, we plot how the conditional mean shares of transacted 
properties in either good or poor condition evolved in the renewal areas relative to the 
revitalization areas over time. The indices are generated using auxiliary regressions de-
scribed in the figure notes. From the mix-adjusted quality trends, it is evident that the 
quality of the housing stock in the renewal areas improved significantly over time. In 
1990, the fraction of buildings in poor condition in renewal areas was significantly larger 
than in the investigation areas, possibly a reason for their selection. The difference steadi-
ly declines over time. By the end of the observation period, the relationship is at the mar-
gin of becoming negative and statistically significant. While the conditional mean shares of 
properties in good maintenance were virtually the same in 1990, the proportion was sig-
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nificantly larger in the renewal areas by the end of the period. Figure 2 demonstrates this 
development and indicates that the renewal program accelerated the upgrading of the 
housing stock that was left behind during the division period.  
Fig. 2: Maintenance trends in renewal areas 
Condition Good 
 
Condition Bad 
 
Notes: Year specific differences in mean shares are estimated in two separate regressions of the following 
type:     ∑         ∑             , where Yit indicates whether a property at time t was in 
good (left) or poor (right) maintenance and X0 controls for the following property features: age, 
plot area, and floor space index.    is an indicator variable discriminating between whether a prop-
erty falls within a renewal area (T=1) or within a revitalization area (T=0). Black solid (dashed) 
lines indicate    point estimates (95% confidence intervals). Red dashed lines are lowess smoothes 
of the parameters. Similar trends with alternative sets of covariates are presented in Figure A2 in 
the appendix. 
Controlling for additional property features does not generally significantly alter the re-
sults, nor does using the other control groups. Alternative estimations using additional 
covariates and different control groups are presented and discussed in the appendix. 
4 Empirical Results 
Renewal area effects 
Table 1 summarizes our parametric estimates (see specification 11) of renewal area capi-
talization effects by varying control groups and samples. For the sake of brevity, we focus 
on the treatment estimates of primary interest. The complete estimates of the structural 
and location parameters are in line with the typical findings in similar studies and report-
ed in Table A6 in the web based appendix. The parameter on TxPOST (  ) indicates a shift 
in log prices at the time of designation, while the parameter on TxV (  ) reveals the yearly 
percentage appreciation within the renewal areas relative to the control areas in the post 
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designation period. Based on the two estimated parameters, the aggregated renewal poli-
cy effect for any given year since designation can be computed as (   (        ))18 
Models (1-6) (upper panel of Table 1) estimate the gross-capitalization effect of the policy 
comprising both internal property and externality effects. Model 1 compares the evolution 
of property prices within the renewal areas to the rest of Berlin, our most general control 
group (1a). The results suggest that a positive long-run trend (approximately 4.7% per 
year) dominates a negative intercept (-16.2%). After V=20 years, sales prices in designated 
renewal areas, on average, have appreciated by as much as 119.4% relative to the rest of 
the city. This corresponds to an average yearly appreciation rate of approximately 
(        )            . As we increase the strength of the counterfactual using 
spatially proximate properties (2), the investigation areas (3) or the matched properties 
(4) as a control group, the cumulative effect (average appreciation rate) drops to 94.49% 
(3.3%), 49.79% (2.04%), and 42.7% (1.79%), respectively. Most notable are the effects of 
the inclusion of time-varying effects in models (5) and (6), which compared to the baseline 
models (3) and (4), reduce the cumulative effect to – a non-significant - 7.33% (8.3%) in 
model 5 (6). This implies a – non-significant - average annual appreciation of approxi-
mately 0.375%. One interpretation of this remarkable decline is that the relative apprecia-
tion of the renewal areas is to a significant extent driven by their favorable location with 
respect to distance to the CBD, consumption amenity endowment and the districts they 
fall in, i.e., they would have appreciated even in the absence of the policy. If, however, the 
changes in the implicit prices (e.g., of distance to the CBD) were driven by the policy, e.g., 
central locations became generally more attractive because of the renewal efforts, the 
time-varying effects would be absorbing some variation that was genuinely attributable to 
the policy.19 To this extent, the results in columns (5) and (6) represent lower bound esti-
mates of the policy impact and those in columns (3) and (5) indicate upper bounds. 
The estimated effects tend to decline relative to the comparable full models when the 
sample is restricted to properties in good physical condition (lower panel of Table 1). 
Moreover, the results are relatively unstable across varying control groups, and none of 
                                                             
18  We make use of the conventional interpretation of dummy variables in semi-log models 
(Halvorsen & Palmquist, 1980). 
19  This problem is a variant of the “bad control problem“ (Angrist & Pischke, 2009). 
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the effects are estimated at satisfying levels of statistical significance. While this may be 
partially driven by the reduction in observations and loss of degrees of freedom (which 
also leads us to not estimate the demanding model with time varying effects on this sam-
ple), the results are at least indicative that the benchmark results are not primarily driven 
by externality effects.  
Tab. 1. Renewal Area Treatment Effects 
Control group 
  
1a 2a 3a 4a 3a 4a 
All All < 2 km Investiga-
tion Areas 
Matched 
Observa-
tions 
Investigation 
Areas 
Matched 
Observa-
tions 
 All properties 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
T x POST -0.162*** -0.115*** -0.060 -0.139*** -0.120*** -0.026 
(within renewal) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.052) (0.045) (0.061) 
T x V (years since 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.010*** 0.005 
designation) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Cum. effect after  119.4%*** 94.49%*** 49.79%*** 42.7%*** 7.33% 8.3% 
20 years (6.62%) (6.84%) (7.32%) (9.79%) (7.32%) (11.12%) 
Av. appr. Rate 4.01% 3.38% 2.04% 1.79% 0.35% 0.4% 
Observations 64,677 17,447 8,623 8,860 8,623 8,860 
R² 0.802 0.772 0.632 0.710 0.677 0.735 
AIC 79,932.8 25,276.8 12,347.3 13,477.5 11,778.3 13,226.6 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Traffic Cell E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-Varying E. NO NO NO NO YES YES 
 Buildings in good condition 
 (7) (8) (9) (10)   
T x POST 0.008 -0.070 0.084 0.500 - - 
(within renewal) (0.338) (0.416) (1.063) (1.232)   
T x V (years since -0.000 -0.002 -0.026 -0.001 - - 
designation) (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)   
Cum. effect after  0.67% -9.84% -35.94% 62.55% - - 
20 years (39.49%) (50.23%) (187.56%) (245.52%)   
Av. appr. Rate 0.003% -0.52% -2.2% 2.4% - - 
Observations 15,406 2,567 787 948 - - 
R² 0.917 0.941 0.863 0.890 - - 
AIC 5,491.0 1,475.9 558.9 738.4 - - 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES   
Location Controls YES YES YES YES   
Traffic Cell E. YES YES YES YES   
Year Effects YES YES YES YES   
Time-Varying E. NO NO NO NO   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hedonic and location controls 
consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics de-
scribed in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Time-varying controls are sets of in-
teraction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a consumption amenity 
measure described in the data section. 
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Figure 3 illustrates our semi-non-parametric estimates of the temporal treatment function 
according to equation 12. We present estimates for all properties (upper row), all proper-
ties including time varying effects (middle row), and properties in good condition only 
(bottom row) using control group 1a (all properties outside renewal areas) and 3a (prop-
erties in investigation areas). The semi-non-parametric estimates are generally in line 
with the parametric counterparts presented in Table 1. The cumulative effect on all prop-
erties inside renewal areas relative to those outside the renewal areas is even slightly 
larger than implied by the parametric estimates (upper left), but declines to approximate-
ly 50% when the trend is benchmarked against the investigation areas (upper right). The 
positive trend effects seem to capitalize with some delay (beginning after approximately 5 
years). The negative level shifts found in Table 1, thus, appear to be primarily driven by 
parametric constraints and should not necessarily be taken as indicative of a significant 
decline in prices immediately following designation. We note that the cumulative effect 
after 20 years in the models with time-varying effects is within the same range as model 
(5) in Table 1 but not statistically significant. Focusing on properties in good condition, we 
again find that the cumulative effect after 20 years is not statistically distinguishable from 
zero, partly due to large standard errors. We are, thus, not able to affirm the existence of 
significant revitalization effects based on the most demanding semi-parametric models. 
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Fig. 3: Price trends in renewal areas, relative to varying control groups 
Control group 1a Control group 3a 
All properties 
  
All properties & time varying effects 
Control group 1a Control group 3a 
  
In good condition 
Control group 1a Control group 3a  
  
Notes: Black solid (dashed) lines indicate treatment point estimates (95% confidence intervals). Red 
dashed lines are lowess smoothes of the parameters. 
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Spillover effects 
Table 2 and Figure 4 replicate the analysis for the spillover areas, i.e., the 500 m buffer just 
outside the renewal areas. As the external areas have not been targeted by the policy, 
housing externalities can be identified using all buildings irrespective of their maintenance 
condition. The 500 m buffer area previously excluded due to the presence of spillovers 
now serves as a treatment group to detect spillover effects. Lower thresholds generally 
yield similar results, but suffer from a loss of degrees of freedom. The results are easily 
summarized. For our preferred control groups (3 and 4), we find results that are within 
the same range as the internal effects in the baseline model (columns 3 and 4). The revital-
ization effect, however, is statistically indistinguishable from zero once we control for in-
dependent appreciation trends that using the time-varying effect.  
Tab. 2. Renewal Area Spillover Effects 
Control group 1b 2b 3b 4b 3b 3b 
  
All 
< 2 km 
renewal 
area buffer 
Invest. 
Areas + 1 
km  
buffer 
Matched 
Observations 
Invest. 
Areas + 1 
km buffer 
Matched 
Observations 
 500 meter buffer  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
T x POST -0.124** -0.145** -0.149** -0.095* -0.052 -0.057 
(within renewal) (0.052) (0.059) (0.061) (0.056) (0.056) (0.067) 
T x V (years 0.020*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.024*** -0.000 0.000 
since designation) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Cum. effect after  31.6%*** 38.25%*** 42.9%*** 46.46%*** -4.41% -4.67% 
20 years (6.06%) (6.54%) (6.68%) (7.06%) (5.63%) (8.41%) 
Av. appr. Rate 1.38% 1.63% 1.8% 1.93% -0.23% -0.24% 
Observations 66,865 19,421 11,963 16,989 11,963 16,989 
R² 0.690 0.657 0.605 0.636 0.671 0.662 
AIC 113,544.3 36,076.0 21,172.5 32,244.7 19,093.6 30,244.1 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Traffic Cell E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-Varying E. NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Notes: Marginal effects; standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hedonic and 
location controls consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location char-
acteristics described in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Time-varying controls 
are sets of interaction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a con-
sumption amenity measure described in the data section. 
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Fig. 4: Price trends in spillover areas, compared to different control groups 
Control group 1b Control group 3b 
All properties 
  
All properties & time varying effects 
Control group 1b Control group 3b 
  
Notes: Black solid (dashed) lines indicate treatment point estimates (95% confidence intervals). Red 
dashed lines are lowess smoothes of the parameters. 
Robustness and extension 
A number of alterations to the renewal and spillover models are discussed in more detail 
in the appendix. We test for the possibility that the designation of renewal areas repre-
sented a negative signal to the remaining investigation areas, which could invalidate the 
counterfactual provided. We replace the contemporary amenity density with an analogi-
cally constructed variant that uses bars and restaurants as reported in the 1995/6 edition 
of the yellow pages (Gelbe Seiten), which should predate the impact of the designation of 
renewal areas. To estimate the spillover effect holding the quality of the building stock 
constant, we add maintenance controls to the spillover models. We use distance to the 
renewal area boundary as a (external) treatment measure to account for the possibility 
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that a housing externality is steeply decaying within the spillover area. To allow for conta-
gion in the spillover effect, we further model an interaction of the spatial decay with the 
time trend. All results support the interpretations and conclusions presented in this doc-
ument.  
Sensitivity analysis and treatment heterogeneity 
One favorable feature of our empirical setting is the availability of a relatively large num-
ber of treatment (22 designated renewal areas) and control areas (22 self-contained zones 
out of 39 areas initially considered). Our empirical models control for unobserved time-
invariant spatial heterogeneity, unobserved shocks at the city district level and unob-
served shocks that are correlated with distance to the CBD and the spatial distribution of 
consumption amenities. Successful identification rests on the assumption that the treated 
and control areas are subject to the same macro-economic shocks conditional on these 
controls. The relatively large number of treatment and control areas arguably helps with 
the identification because idiosyncratic year-area specific shocks are more likely to cancel 
each other out within larger groups of treated or control areas.  
To evaluate the sensitivity of the identified treatment effect to the number of treated or 
control areas considered, we replicate our benchmark model using various combinations 
of 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20, or all treatment or control areas. For each combination considered, we 
run 2,500 iterations with randomly selected areas (unless the total number of combina-
tions is exhausted at a lower number, in which case we simply run all combinations). The 
results are summarized in Table 3. One notable finding is that in all series, the mean of the 
estimated cumulated policy effects after 20 years is within approximately one standard 
deviation of zero, which is consistent with the policy not having a statistically significant 
impact. Equally important, the estimates tend to fall into a narrower range as the number 
of areas considered is increased. The percentage of individual estimates falling within two 
standard error lengths of our benchmark result (Table 1, column 5, upper panel) increase 
from 36 (32) to near 100 percent as we increase the number of treatment (control) areas 
from 1 to 15, holding the number of control (treated) areas constant. The effect is even 
larger if the number of treatment and control areas considered is increased at the same 
time. The estimates become reasonably precise once ten treated and control areas are 
selected. Selected distributions of the estimated effects are graphically illustrated in the 
appendix. 
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We conclude that some care is warranted when interpreting the results of quasi-
experimental place-based policy evaluations based on small numbers of treatment or con-
trol areas. While in practice, little can be done to overcome the limitation of a policy exper-
iment that offers only a small number of targeted areas, the matching approach used in the 
construction of control groups 4a/b can be considered as an alternative or a robustness 
check when only a few obvious candidate areas exist to establish a counterfactual.  
Tab. 3. Varying groups of treated and controls  
No of areas Cumulated effect after 20 years % within 2 S.E. length 
of bench. Treat. Control Iterations Mean S.D. Min Max 
Varying number of treated areas 
1 22 22 0.04 0.48 -1.00 0.98 36.36% 
2 22 462 0.02 0.30 -0.91 0.64 52.81% 
5 22 2500 0.05 0.18 -0.62 0.53 80.00% 
10 22 2500 0.07 0.11 -0.30 0.42 96.44% 
15 22 2500 0.08 0.08 -0.16 0.30 99.80% 
20 22 2500 0.09 0.08 -0.18 0.30 99.64% 
Varying number of control areas 
22 1 22 -0.12 0.34 -0.67 0.69 31.82% 
22 2 462 -0.07 0.30 -0.78 0.69 53.68% 
22 5 2500 -0.01 0.17 -0.79 0.74 76.56% 
22 10 2500 0.01 0.09 -0.38 0.31 92.44% 
22 15 2500 0.02 0.05 -0.16 0.17 99.08% 
22 20 2500 0.02 0.05 -0.22 0.18 99.32% 
Varying number of treated and control areas 
1 1 2261 44.3 449 -1242 10063 0.97% 
2 2 2500 7.14 131 -1054 3407 8.72% 
5 5 2500 0.40 3.61 -22.56 85.65 42.56% 
10 10 2500 0.10 0.16 -0.58 0.72 84.48% 
15 15 2500 0.06 0.08 -0.39 0.38 98.08% 
20 20 2500 0.07 0.08 -0.31 0.36 98.48% 
Notes: Each row describes the distribution of the cumulated effects after 20 years derived from a series of 
estimations of the benchmark specification (equations 9 + 11). The effects are expressed in units 
of log-differences. We consider all possible combinations of one or two treated vs. all (22) control 
areas and vice versa. For all other combinations we use 2500 randomly drawn selections.  
The sensitivity analysis presented here has been deliberately established to illustrate the 
sensitivity of the baseline setup to varying numbers of treated and control areas. In the 
appendix, we provide treatment estimates by renewal area using a simplified version of 
the benchmark specification, which economizes on degrees of freedom at the expense of 
limiting causal inference. The results confirm a significant degree of treatment heteroge-
neity, suggesting that some areas may be more responsive to external stimuli than others.  
5 Conclusion 
Urban renewal programs have become a common instrument to mitigate and reverse the 
negative effects of urban decline and promote positive housing externalities. Public ex-
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penditures on such programs are justified on the grounds of the positive, non-marketed 
externality building maintenance is anticipated to have on economic (and social) out-
comes and the hope that the (temporary) stimulation of private investment can trigger an 
upward spiral in a neighborhood.  
We contribute to a fresh strand of literature that examines the economic outcomes of ur-
ban renewal policies recently inaugurated by RH. We add to their case by analyzing a $2.3 
bill. neighborhood renewal program designed to promote the recovery of 22 neighbor-
hoods in Berlin, Germany that had suffered particularly severely during the period of divi-
sion in the 20th century. We track the evolution of property prices in these neighborhoods 
over approximately 20 years and compare the trends to neighborhoods that were not se-
lected for the program, but are otherwise similar.  
Given the expectations that have motivated the renewal program in question and similar 
programs, our results are simultaneously encouraging and disillusioning. On the one hand, 
our results indicate that the policy led to increased renovation work, improved mainte-
nance, and an appreciation of the renovated buildings in the targeted neighborhoods. Over 
approximately 20 years, the share of buildings in poor (good) condition declined (in-
creased) by approximately 25% (10%) relative to similar untargeted areas. Compared to 
similar areas considered, but not selected for the program, property prices, on average, 
after 20 year of operation of the program increased by approximately 45%, which equates 
to a yearly appreciation rate of 1.9%. The appreciation is even larger compared to the city 
average.  
Our results, however, also suggest that this appreciation is at least partially attributable to 
the favorable locations of these areas. Controlling for trends related to proximity to the 
CBD, the distribution of consumption amenities, and individual city districts, our most 
careful results point to a cumulative effect of less than 10%, which corresponds to an an-
nual appreciation of less than 0.5%. Equally important, our results, on average, do not 
point to the self-reinforcing effect operating through housing externalities for which one 
may have hoped. The increase in property value seems largely attributable to the upgrade 
of internal quality, and there are no significant spillovers to adjacent areas. Back of the 
envelope calculations suggest that total property value increased by only €0.35-€1.8 for 
each €1 spent on the program, taking the abovementioned lower and upper bound esti-
mates as a benchmark (see the appendix for details). We conclude that the policy sped up 
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the renovation of significant fractions of the urban fabric and, as such, helped eliminating 
the visible traces of the division period. However, it has also primarily been a cash transfer 
to landlords participating in the program.  
Despite the improvements in building stock likely caused by the policy, our results look 
less favorable than those previously presented by RH for the Neighborhoods in Bloom 
program in Richmond, Virginia. Analyzing a much smaller program of $14 mill., RH find 
positive and large effects on property values in four renewal areas that exceed the invest-
ments by a factor of two to six and significant spillovers into adjacent areas. There are 
some explanations that may account for the large discrepancy in the findings for Rich-
mond and Berlin. The first are the different structures of the two local communities. The 
Richmond program was more based on community volunteering and local non-profit or-
ganizations, while Berlin adopted a top-down approach implemented by official state au-
thorities with little community participation. Second, and perhaps more important, Ger-
man cities, and especially in Berlin, are not directly comparable to the average US city in 
that many residents choose to rent apartments. As a result, much of the downtown hous-
ing stock is owned by landlords and occupied by renters. Absentee landlords, however, are 
often argued to spend less on maintenance than owner-occupiers (Galster, 1983). Similar-
ly, owners have been demonstrated to invest more in social capital (DiPasquale & Glaeser, 
1999; Hilber, 2010) and tend to use neighborhood policies as a framework to coordinate 
their behavior to internalize externalities (Holman & Ahlfeldt, 2013), as such, they may 
also be more receptive to renovation subsidies. Third, there is some indication that the 
impact of the policy varied across targeted neighborhoods in Berlin. While the individual 
effects by renewal area need to be interpreted with care, the heterogeneity may indicate 
that some areas are more responsive to external stimuli than others.  
Future research into the long-run effects of renewal policies across different institutional 
settings is needed to fully reconcile the evidence. Understanding the factors that deter-
mine how incentivizing private investment in building maintenance can lead to positive 
spillovers is key to deciding where such programs should be implemented and where the 
focus should be on improvements of fundamental location factors in the first place. More 
generally, we recommend that quasi-experimental place based policy evaluations be based 
on a sufficiently diversified set of treatment and control areas   
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1 Introduction 
This technical appendix complements the main paper by providing complementary evi-
dence and additional detail on the data used. The appendix is not designed to stand alone 
or replace the main paper. Section 2 adds to the empirical strategy and data section of the 
main paper, providing additional detail on the renewal areas and the control groups and 
data. Section 3 provides complementary evidence that extends the results in section 4 of 
the main paper. To improve readability, the respective sections of the main paper are par-
tially replicated.   
2 Data 
This section provides additional information on the studied areas and descriptive evi-
dence not reported in the main paper to save space. 
2.1  Renewal and Investigation Areas 
This (sub) section presents the studied areas in greater detail. To convey an understand-
ing of the size and form of the relevant space, Figure 1 in the main paper depicts the re-
newal and investigation areas. Figure A1 provides a more detailed picture of a cluster of 
renewal areas (grey) in East Berlin. Investigation areas that were partially transformed 
into renewal areas are hatched (diagonal parallel lines). It is reassuring that the matched 
                                                             
   London School of Economics (LSE), Department of Geography and Environment & Spatial 
Economics Research Centre (SERC), Houghton Street, London WC2A 2AE, g.ahlfeldt@lse.ac.uk, 
www.ahlfeldt.com     
 University of Hamburg, Department of Economics, Von Melle Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, wolf-
gang.maennig@wiso.uni-hamburg.de, www.uni-hamburg.de/economicpolicy  
 University of Hamburg, Department of Economics, Von Melle Park 5, 20146 Hamburg, fe-
lix.richter@wiso.uni-hamburg.de, www.uni-hamburg.de/economicpolicy 
AHLFELDT, MAENNIG & RICHTER – Urban renewal after the Berlin Wall 2 
observations (red X) and the investigation areas cover similar areas (if outside the 500 m 
buffer), while geographically proximate but structurally different areas (for example 
Wedding) are underrepresented. Some technical details on the matching technique are 
discussed in the next subsection.   
In Table A1, we present some additional descriptive statistics on the renewal areas includ-
ing exact dates of beginning and end of the designation, number of housing units and 
properties and population.  
Fig. A1.  Snapshot Renewal Areas 
 
Notes: Own illustration based on the urban and environmental information system (Senatsverwaltung für 
Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006). Dark shaded (hatched) areas indicate renewal (investigation) 
areas. Black (red) crosses indicate (matched) transactions (in CG 4a).  
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Tab A1.  Descriptive Statistics Renewal Areas 
     dwelling  
Name start end area (km2) properties  units residents 
Samariterviertel 09.10.1993 10.02.2008 0.339 263 5302 8324 
Warschauer Strasse 04.12.1994 28.04.2011 0.381 227 5110 8599 
Traveplatz Ostkreuz 04.12.1994 11.07.2010 0.351 204 4380 6964 
Kaskelstrasse 04.12.1994 10.02.2008 0.221 248 1665 3394 
Weitlingstrasse 04.12.1994 28.01.2009 0.503 331 4214 5337 
Spandauer Vorstadt 09.10.1993 10.02.2008 0.671 632 5809 8771 
Beusselstrasse 04.12.1994 21.02.2007 0.106 93 2314 3045 
Rosenthaler Vorstadt 04.12.1994 28.01.2009 0.376 373 4809 6794 
Stephankiez 10.11.1995 21.02.2007 0.063 54 1288 1860 
Soldiner Strasse 10.11.1995 21.02.2007 0.019 11 447 661 
Wederstrasse 10.11.1995 11.07.2010 0.246 233 1341 2079 
Kottbusser Damm Ost 10.11.1995 21.02.2007 0.025 21 380 522 
Kollwitzplatz 09.10.1993 28.01.2009 0.607 476 6519 11412 
Helmholtzplatz 09.10.1993  0.819 560 13338 21211 
Winsstrasse 04.12.1994 28.04.2011 0.348 219 4850 8568 
Wollankstrasse 04.12.1994 28.04.2011 0.685 338 3386 7719 
Teutoburger Platz 04.12.1994 12.02.2013 0.498 316 4432 7950 
Komponistenviertel 04.12.1994 11.07.2010 0.339 477 3443 7400 
Boetzowstrasse 10.11.1995 28.04.2011 0.381 191 3072 6211 
Altstadt Kiez Vorstadt 09.10.1993 21.02.2007 0.351 225 1105 2115 
Niederschöneweide 04.12.1994  0.221 97 799 1368 
Oberschöneweide 10.11.1995 11.07.2010 0.503 255 3465 5375 
Notes: The data for area, properties, dwelling units, and residents are from the Berlin administrative unit 
for urban development and environment (Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung und Umwelt, 
2007). The Renewal Area “Teutoburger Platz” was deregulated after the end of our observation pe-
riod (August 2012). The data for the areas “Komponistenviertel” and “Niederschöneweide” are 
from 2010.  
Table A2 provides a comparison of the renewal areas, the investigation areas and the rest 
of Berlin. While there are some differences, the structural similarities between the renew-
al areas and the investigation areas are striking when compared to the rest of Berlin. The 
housing stock is much older than in the rest of Berlin, and the floor space index is higher. 
The reason is, in part, that single-family houses are practically not existent in the in the 
centrally located renewal and investigation areas, while naturally abundant in the periph-
eral parts of the rest of the city. The takeaway is that the renewal areas and the investiga-
tion areas are relatively homogenous areas dominated by buildings constructed around 
the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries (the so called founding period / “Gründerzeit”). 
These are primarily apartment blocks, often with some commercial units on the ground 
floor. 
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Tab A2. Comparative Statistics 
  Renewal Areas Investigation Areas 
Rest of Berlin (without RE-
NEWAL / INVEST ) 
Price (cpi adjusted) € 1,490,795.00 € 1,382,921.00 € 1,503,588.00 
 (€ 3,290,749.00) (€ 1,548,053.00) (€ 5,667,000.00) 
Age 101.5 96.0 60.3 
 (22.8) (23.6) (36.5) 
Floor space index 2.609 2.902 1.127 
 (0.981) (1.074) (1.230) 
Average plot size 1058 1003 1798 
 (1834) (1481) (6515) 
Share of foreigners  0.14 0.17 0.11 
 (0.14) (0.11) (0.13) 
Single family home (%) 0.35 1.35 46.26 
Apartment / buildings (%) 29.67 37.39 19.39 
Mixed use buildings (%) 62.05 55.35 19.02 
Commercial buildings (%) 3.69 1.68 2.35 
Notes: Prices are in 2012 Euros 
2.2  Control Groups 
This section discusses the different control groups and presents some technical details on 
the creation of control groups 4a and 4b. Overall, we observe approximately 71,000 trans-
actions between 1990 and 2012 in Berlin, with between 2,200 and 6,000 observations per 
year. Of these transactions, 4,500 occurred inside our renewal areas. The transactions are 
compared to varying control groups, where the direct surroundings within a 500 m buffer 
of each renewal area are excluded from every control group. The rationale is to ensure 
that the counterfactual provided by the control groups is not contaminated by spillover 
effects. The first control group (1a) comprises all other transactions (outside the 500 m 
buffer) and the second (2a) all transactions in a 500-2,000 meter radius. Control group 
(3a) consists of the fractions of the investigation areas outside the 500 m buffer and in-
cludes approximately 4,000 transactions. The matching procedure discussed below results 
in 4,200 transactions that are matched to our renewal area transactions (Control Group 
4a). In the second step, we observe 6,600 transactions that are located in a 500 meter ra-
dius around the renewal areas and compare them to all other transactions (1b)1, all trans-
actions in a 500 to 2,000 meter radius around the renewal areas (Control group 2b, 12,800 
obs.), the investigation areas plus a 1,000 meter buffer around them (Control group 3b, 
10,200 obs.), and to the matched observations discussed below (Control group 4b, 10,300 
obs.).  
                                                             
1 Transactions inside the renewal areas are completely excluded from the sample in the second 
step. 
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We generate control groups 4a & 4b using a synthetic matching technique: We use the 
propensity score matching methodology advanced by Rosenbaum & Rubin (1983) to find 
observations that are structurally similar to the transactions in the renewal areas (4a) and 
the transactions in a 500 meter radius around the renewal areas (4b). For the estimation 
of the internal effects (models 4, 6, and 10, Table 1), we include the following covariates: 
age of the building, building type, location quality, typical area floor space index, distance 
to the nearest park, main street, playground, waterway, and public transport station, lati-
tude and longitude, and a set of dummies controlling for land use and east / west location. 
For the external effects (models 4 and 6, Table 2), we include age, building type, location 
quality, building structure, location characteristics, and distance to the nearest main 
street. In both cases, we match the treatment group to the control group using nearest 
neighbor matching. The matching process creates subsamples, where the difference in 
means between the treatment and control group is substantially reduced. Tables A3 and 
A4 report the average treatment effect on the treated (ATT) and several measures of the 
balance of the covariates for the control groups (4a and 4b).   
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Tab A3. Control Group 4a 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated       
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Unmatched 13.418962 12.8458767 0.5730857 0.015963518 35.9 
ATT 13.418962 13.3384842 0.0804782 0.021071276 3.82 
      
Balancing of the covariates           
Variable Sample Mean Control standardized % reduction   
  Treated  bias (%) in abs. bias 
Age Unmatched 100.81 59.704 136.9  
 Matched 101.5 92.186 31 77.3 
Building type Unmatched 4.7429 2.7689 132  
 Matched 4.7947 4.9221 -8.5 93.5 
East / west Unmatched 0.04238 0.64936 -165.7  
 Matched 0.04264 0.07909 -10 94 
Longitude Unmatched 27282 23782 55.4  
 Matched 27271 28781 -23.9 56.8 
Latitude Unmatched 21874 19423 43.9  
 Matched 21900 21080 14.7 66.5 
Location quality Unmatched 2.5171 3.7574 -61.4  
 Matched 2.7627 3.1517 -19.2 68.6 
Typical floor space index Unmatched 2.2635 1.0455 163.9  
 Matched 2.263 1.7998 62.3 62 
Residential area indicator Unmatched 0.86687 0.84722 5.6  
 Matched 0.9545 0.90186 15 -167.9 
Commercial area indicator Unmatched 0.02761 0.01855 6  
 Matched 0.02978 0.06051 -20.5 -239.1 
Distance to CBD Unmatched 4705.4 9250.6 -120.3  
 Matched 4697 6698.9 -53 56 
Distance to park Unmatched 2138.2 1695.4 39  
 Matched 2132.2 1801.8 29.1 25.4 
Distance to main street Unmatched 127.43 198.62 -40.4  
 Matched 127.63 125.6 1.2 97.1 
Distance to water Unmatched 1406.7 1594.7 -16.6  
  Matched 1399.3 1192.6 18.3 -10 
Notes: The propensity scores are computed using nearest neighbor matching. Following Rosenbaum & 
Rubin (1985) and Leuven & Sianesi (2003), the standardized bias is the difference between the 
sample means in the sub-samples (treated and control), computed as the percentage of the 
square root of the average of the sample variances in the treated and control groups. 
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Tab A4. Control Group 4b 
Average Treatment Effect on the Treated         
Sample Treated Controls Difference S.E. T-stat 
Unmatched 13.5304659 12.7900137 0.7404521 0.011078247 66.84 
ATT 13.5304659 13.7777444 -0.2472785 0.015212132 -16.26 
      
Balancing of the covariates           
Variable Sample Mean Control standardized % reduction   
  Treated  bias (%) in abs. bias 
Age Unmatched 87.676 56.839 90.2  
 Matched 88.573 80.826 22.7 74.9 
Building type Unmatched 4.5572 2.6331 116.1  
 Matched 4.557 4.6999 -8.6 92.6 
Location quality Unmatched 2.7652 3.8524 -51.8  
 Matched 2.9681 3.4993 -25.3 51.1 
Typical floor space index Unmatched 2.1696 0.93918 149.7  
 Matched 2.1696 2.0385 16 89.3 
Residential area indicator Unmatched 0.81127 0.8462 -9.3  
 Matched 0.89713 0.85686 10.7 -15.3 
Commercial area indicator Unmatched 0.03934 0.02194 10.1  
 Matched 0.04305 0.06744 -14.2 -40.2 
Distance to CBD Unmatched 5006.4 9667.8 -121.5  
 Matched 4980.7 5402.4 -11 91 
Distance to park Unmatched 2302.5 1595.4 55.4  
 Matched 2293.1 1973 25.1 54.7 
Distance to main street Unmatched 125.19 208.07 -45.2  
 Matched 125.12 115.84 5.1 88.8 
Distance to water Unmatched 1245.7 1626.5 -32.4  
  Matched 1245.9 1200.5 3.9 88.1 
Notes: The propensity scores are computed using nearest neighbor matching. Following Rosenbaum and 
Rubin (1985) and Leuven and Sianesi (2003), the standardized bias is the difference in the sam-
ple means in the sub-samples (treated and control) as the percentage of the square root of the 
average of the sample variances in the treated and control groups. 
2.3  Maintenance Trends 
This section further adds to section 3.4., complementing the conditional mean shares anal-
ysis of the maintenance trends. As mentioned in the notes to Figure 2 in the main paper, 
we estimate two separate regressions of the type:  
 
    ∑         ∑           
  
 
where Yit indicates whether a property at time t was in good or poor maintenance condi-
tion. In Figure A2, we vary the vector     by including or excluding additional covariates 
and the control groups (CG) to which we compare the transactions in the renewal areas. 
Thus,    is an indicator variable indicating whether a property falls within a renewal area 
(T=1) or a control group area (T=0). The first column presents the results for an empty 
model where we exclude     completely (the unconditional share), in the second row we 
add land use dummies and buyer / seller type indicators to the benchmark model covari-
ates. In row 3, we employ the same covariates as in the main paper, but instead of compar-
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ing the conditional shares in renewal areas to the shares in all investigation areas, we 
compare them to the overall share in Berlin. The results are relatively insensitive to these 
alternations at least in qualitative terms: Over the designation period, the share of build-
ings in good condition increases in the renewal areas relative to other areas, while the 
share of buildings in poor condition decreases.  
Fig. A2.  Maintenance Trends 
Condition Good Condition Bad 
Empty model, CG 3 
 
Empty model, CG 3 
 
Full model, CG 3 
 
Full model, CG 3 
 
Benchmark model, CG 1 
 
Benchmark model, CG 1 
 
Notes:  Black solid (dashed) lines indicate treatment point estimates (95% confidence intervals). Red 
dashed lines are lowess smoothes of the parameters. 
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3 Empirical Results 
This section complements section 4 of the main paper. The first sub-section provides an 
overview over the variables and presents some of the estimation results omitted in the 
main paper. Section 3.2 discusses the possible designation effects on the runner-up areas 
that remained unconsidered. In section 3.3, we replicate our benchmark results using an 
urban amenity density measure based on historic data. Section 3.4 provides estimates of 
spillover effects controlling for building quality, while section 3.5 introduces a spatiotem-
poral structure into the spillover effects. In section 3.6, we provide a sensitivity analysis of 
out treatment estimates with respect to the number of areas included in the treatment and 
control groups as well as an analysis of heterogeneity in the effect across the treated areas. 
Finally, section 3.7 discusses the aggregated capitalization effect of the policy.  
3.1  Complete results 
Table A5 provides descriptive statistics for all structural and locational variables. Table A6 
extends Table 1 in the main paper by presenting the implicit hedonic prices of the struc-
tural characteristics. 
Tab A5. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Price (constant 2012 €) 1,495,060 5,356,786 16,631 299,000,000 
Plotarea (m²) 1682.062 6086.808 150 205222 
Floor space index 1915.712 6105.441 65 191375 
Age (years) 65.51245 37.42346 0 294 
Age squared 5692.38 4857.659 0 86436 
West / east indicator 0.6099851 0.4877562 0 1 
Residential area indicator 0.8415044 0.3652073 0 1 
Commercial area indicator 0.0287225 0.1670266 0 1 
industrial area indicator 0.0323323 0.1768823 0 1 
Distance to main street (m) 182.3591 207.0289 0 2140.739 
Distance to public transport (m) 980.7227 988.5591 10.0361 9381.628 
Distance to open water (m) 1515.542 1297.361 0 8316.602 
Distance to park (m) 1786.17 1377.644 0 5972.606 
Distance to playground (m) 325.5659 318.355 10.34 6209.051 
Distance to listed building building (m) 230.9044 270.7093 0.2341669 2829.887 
Street noise level 57.42288 9.529247 15.0819 94.5513 
Location within block     
Building at street front (%) 73.34    
Building at a corner (%) 13.98    
Building with multiple fronts (%) 3.89    
Hammer type Building (%) 1.41    
Building in inner block loc. (%) 6.66    
Other (%) 4.61    
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Tab A6.  Complete Results 
Control group 1a 2a 3a 4a 3a 4a 
 All All < 2 km Investiga-
tion Areas 
Matched 
Observa-
tions 
Investigation 
Areas 
Matched 
Observa-
tions 
 All properties 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 
T x POST -0.162*** -0.115*** -0.060 -0.139*** -0.120*** -0.026 
(renewal) (0.036) (0.037) (0.039) (0.052) (0.045) (0.061) 
T x V (years 0.047*** 0.039*** 0.023*** 0.025*** 0.010*** 0.005 
since des.) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Building age -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.012*** -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.010*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Building age, 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 
squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Industrial 0.128* -0.112 0.127 0.257 0.147 0.408* 
area indicator (0.072) (0.106) (0.172) (0.221) (0.174) (0.243) 
Residential 0.022 -0.084 0.019 0.035 0.043 0.163 
area indicator (0.048) (0.079) (0.120) (0.147) (0.114) (0.159) 
Commercial 0.356*** 0.221** 0.256* 0.336* 0.219 0.427** 
use indicator (0.061) (0.089) (0.151) (0.172) (0.147) (0.184) 
Plot area 0.000** 0.000 0.000 0.000** -0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Floorspace 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000** 0.000*** 0.000** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Building at a 0.208*** 0.236*** 0.219** 0.322*** 0.223** 0.311*** 
corner (0.041) (0.066) (0.104) (0.106) (0.102) (0.104) 
Build. with 0.348*** 0.117 0.168 0.073 0.194 0.090 
mult. fronts (0.065) (0.102) (0.156) (0.162) (0.152) (0.160) 
Hammer type -0.107** -0.206 -0.087 -0.446 -0.098 -0.445 
Building (0.043) (0.133) (0.258) (0.336) (0.326) (0.310) 
Build. in inner -0.131*** -0.270*** -0.381*** -0.420*** -0.432*** -0.470*** 
block loc. (0.042) (0.085) (0.146) (0.147) (0.145) (0.147) 
Observations 64,677 17,447 8,623 8,860 8,623 8,860 
R² 0.802 0.772 0.632 0.710 0.677 0.735 
AIC 79,932.8 25,276.8 12,349.3 13,477.5 11,776.3 13,224.6 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Traffic Cell E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-Varying E. NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Notes: Table continues on next page 
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Table continued 
Control group 1a 2a 3a 4a   
  All All < 2 km 
Investiga-
tion Areas 
Matched 
Observations 
  
 Properties in good condition 
 7 8 9 10   
T x POST 0.008 -0.070 0.084 0.500   
(renewal) (0.338) (0.416) (1.063) (1.232)   
T x V (years -0.000 -0.002 -0.026 -0.001   
since des. (0.012) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)   
Building age -0.012*** -0.009*** -0.006* -0.006*   
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003)   
Building age,  0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000 0.000   
squared (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Industrial  0.172 0.013 -0.692 .   
area indicator (0.106) (0.160) (1.630) .   
Residential  0.105** -0.011 0.491 0.495   
area indicator (0.051) (0.114) (1.108) (0.753)   
Commercial  0.125 -0.006 0.235 0.444   
use indicator (0.143) (0.209) (1.154) (0.709)   
Plot area 0.000*** 0.000** -0.000 0.000*   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Floors pace 0.000 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.000***   
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)   
Building at a  0.154** 0.128 0.220 -0.252   
corner (0.062) (0.209) (0.520) (0.639)   
Build. with  0.165* -0.393 -0.675 -0.963   
mult. fronts (0.099) (0.336) (0.612) (0.705)   
Hammer type  -0.110* 0.021 . .   
Building (0.064) (0.210) . .   
Build. in inner  -0.064 -0.138 -0.480 -1.011   
block loc. (0.058) (0.220) (0.577) (0.680)   
Observations 15,406 2,567 787 948   
R² 0.917 0.941 0.863 0.890   
AIC 5,491.0 1,475.9 558.9 738.4   
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES   
Location Controls YES YES YES YES   
Traffic Cell E. YES YES YES YES   
Year Effects YES YES YES YES   
Time-Varying E. NO NO NO NO   
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01  
Most coefficients are as expected: To mention some examples, plotarea and floor space 
significantly increase log prices. The land use indicators show, if significant, a positive in-
fluence of residential and commercial areas on logprices (relative to manufacturing sites). 
The age of a building significantly decreases logprices. 
3.2 Designation effects on investigation areas 
One of the identifying assumptions of quasi-experimental research designs is that the con-
trol group used to establish a counterfactual must not be affected itself by the analyzed 
treatment. A control group formed by runner-ups in a selection process would violate this 
assumption if the selection of those being treated changed the expectation regarding the 
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prospect of those remaining untreated. If a positive signal to the treated areas represents a 
negative signal to the runner-up areas, the estimated treatment effect would be biased in a 
positive direction. To avoid the potentially problematic direct comparison of the selected 
renewal areas to the runner-up areas, we benchmark both areas against the matched 
transactions discussed in Section 2. We define the renewal areas and the investigation 
areas that remained undesignated as two separate treatment groups and assign all 
matched transactions outside the investigation areas to the control group. In Table A7, we 
report the results of two models that are analogous to (4) and (6) in Table 2 in the main 
paper, except for the added second treatment group (investigation areas). We choose 
1995 as a (placebo) treatment date for the investigation areas that were not designated 
because the last wave of designation occurred in that year, and the decision not to include 
these areas into the program became definitive. Setting the placebo designation date to 
one of the nearest renewal areas changes the results only marginally. 
The cumulated effects after 20 years for the investigation areas are not statistically differ-
ent from zero, no matter whether we allow for selected time-varying effects or not. This 
finding is consistent with the results in Table 2 in the main paper, where the comparison 
of trends in renewal areas to either the remaining investigation areas or the matched 
transactions led to similar results. While a negative level shift with a compensating posi-
tive trend is found in the model (1), the effect is not robust to the inclusion of time-varying 
effects. Our preferred model (2) also suggests that the cumulated long-run effect of the 
renewal areas is not statistically distinguishable from the remaining investigation areas. 
Taken together, the evidence does not support that the runner-up areas provide an invalid 
counterfactual. To the contrary, the results provide further evidence that the policy had 
marginal impact only because the trends within the group of selected and remaining in-
vestigation areas are very similar. 
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Tab A7. Renewal and investigation areas vs. matched control group  
 Control group 
 
4a  4a  
Matched Observations Matched Observations 
 (1)  (2)  
Treatment Renewal Areas:    
T
REN
 x POST
REN
 (within renewal) -0.001 (0.059) -0.084 (0.063) 
T
REN
 x V
REN
 (years since designation) 0.021*** (0.007) 0.011** (0.005) 
Cum. effect after 20 years 51.50%*** (12.8%) 14.58%* (8.28%) 
Av. appr. Rate 2.1%  0.68%  
Investigation areas:     
T
INV 
x POST
INV
 (within investigation) -0.084 (0.055) 0.037 (0.047) 
T
INV
 x V
INV
 (years since designation) 0.010* (0.006) 0.003 (0.005) 
Cum. effect after 20 years 12.34% (10.32%) 10.31% (9.68%) 
Av. appr. Rate 0.58%  0.49%  
Observations 12,121  12,121  
R² 0.578  0.609  
AIC 21,933.0  21,136.6  
Hedonic Controls YES  YES  
Location controls YES  YES  
Traffic Cell E. YES  YES  
Year Effects YES  YES  
Time-Varying E. NO  YES  
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hedonic and location controls 
consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics de-
scribed in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Time-varying controls are sets of in-
teraction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a consumption amenity 
measure described in the data section. 
3.3 Historic amenity density 
As outlined in the main paper, we employ a kernel smoothed density surface interacted 
with year dummies based on the geographic location of bars, pubs, and nightclubs to ac-
count for the change in valuation for these urban amenities over time. The rationale be-
hind this approach is that particular districts with great centrality and many urban ameni-
ties could have increased in value anyway and that this increase cannot be attributed to 
the designation of the renewal areas. The data stems from the open street map project and 
provides a fairly good overview of the distribution of the urban amenities during the study 
period. One concern, however, is the potential endogeneity of the current (2012) distribu-
tion of amenities to the designation of the renewal areas. To address this concern, we pro-
vide an alternative approach as a robustness check: we collected data for the distribution 
of urban amenities for the years 1995 / 96, the first year in which the yellow pages for 
Berlin reported a zip in a new format that applies to both parts of the formerly divided city 
and allows for precise geocoding. Figure A3 compares the resulting kernel smoothed den-
sity surface (left panel) with the existing density surface displayed in Figure 1 in the main 
paper (right panel): While there is a slight but notable shift in amenity gravity from the 
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south western to the downtown areas, the overall spatial pattern has remained remarka-
bly stable over more than 15 years of convergence to a new post-Berlin Wall equilibrium. 
Fig. A3. Kernel smoothed density surfaces comparison 
Historic distribution 
 
Current distribution
 
Notes: Notes: Own illustration based on the urban and environmental information system 
(Senatsverwaltung für Stadtentwicklung Berlin, 2006). Smoothly grey shaded areas represent the 
consumption amenity density in 1995/96 (left panel) and 2012 (right panel).  
Table A8 replicates our primary results using the consumption amenity density depicted 
in the left panel of Figure A3. Columns 1 and 2 report the effects within renewal areas (in-
ternal effects) when compared to the investigation areas and the matched observations; 
Columns 3 and 4 show the effects on the areas just outside the renewal areas (external 
effects) compared to the respective control groups. The differences from our primary re-
sults are negligible for the internal effects (below 1 percentage point difference after 20 
years) and minor for the external effects. As in our main results, no effects are significantly 
different from zero.  
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Tab A8. Internal & external effects with historic amenities  
 Internal Effects External Effects 
Control group 3a 4a 3b 4b 
  
Invest. Areas 
Matched Obser-
vations 
Invest. Areas + 
1 km buffer 
Matched Obser-
vations 
  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
T x POST -0.113** -0.015 -0.042 -0.034 
(within renewal) (0.044) (0.062) (0.050) (0.064) 
T x V (years 0.009*** 0.005 0.002 0.005 
since designation) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) 
Cum. effect after  7.97% 9.19% -0.21% 6.76% 
20 years (7.15%) (10.73%) (5.07%) (8.24%) 
Av. appr. Rate 0.38% 0.44% -0.01% -0.33% 
Observations 8,623 8,860 11,963 16,989 
R² 0.677 0.736 0.671 0.662 
AIC 11,788.5 13,211.7 19,086.1 30,241.7 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES 
Traffic Cell E. YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES 
Time-Varying E. YES YES YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Hedonic and location controls 
consist of covariates controlling for internal property and external location characteristics de-
scribed in greater detail in the data section and the appendix. Time-varying controls are sets of in-
teraction effects of year effects and distance to the CBD, district effects and a consumption amenity 
measure described in the data section. 
3.4 External effects including quality controls 
For completeness, we also replicate the estimation of spillover effects including the 
maintenance indicators (Table A9). The results reported in the main paper are robust to 
this perturbation. The effects tend to have a similar magnitude and, as expected, we ob-
serve strong price effects associated with the physical condition of the building: Properties 
in good or normal condition generate a large price premium compared to buildings in 
poor condition.  
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Tab A9. External effects including quality controls 
Control group 1b 2b 3b 4b 3b 4b 
  
All 
< 2 km 
renewal 
area buff-
er 
Invest. 
Areas + 1 
km buffer 
Matched 
Observa-
tions 
Invest. 
Areas + 1 
km buffer 
Matched 
Observa-
tions 
 500 meter buffer  
 (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
T x POST -0.133*** -0.125** -0.113** -0.104* -0.041 -0.094 
(within renewal) (0.050) (0.056) (0.056) (0.054) (0.049) (0.066) 
T x V (years 0.017*** 0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019*** -0.002 0.003 
since designation) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005) 
Condition: good 0.307*** 0.567*** 0.598*** 0.500*** 0.571*** 0.487*** 
 (0.015) (0.036) (0.036) (0.034) (0.034) (0.031) 
Condition: bad -0.283*** -0.263*** -0.256*** -0.290*** -0.257*** -0.279*** 
 (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024) (0.021) (0.023) 
Observations 77,564 26,131 22,847 29,842 22,847 29,842 
R² 0.724 0.704 0.687 0.655 0.729 0.696 
AIC 141,269 48,362.4 41,278.9 56,782.8 38,084.7 53,474.5 
Hedonic Controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Location controls YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Traffic Cell E. YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Year Effects YES YES YES YES YES YES 
Time-Varying E. NO NO NO NO YES YES 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
3.5 Spatio-temporal trends 
As outlined in section 4 in the main paper, one might be concerned that the non-significant 
spillovers we find are due to a relatively steep spatial decay and, hence, an impact area 
that is small relative to the 500 m spillover/buffer area used. We have therefore repeated 
our approach allowing for spatio-temporal trends. Restricting the sample to the 500 m 
buffer area around the renewal areas, we first use a POSTxDIST interaction term between 
an indicator variable denoting the period after designation (POST) and the distance to the 
renewal area (DIST) to allow for a change in the spatial trend after the designation. Sec-
ond, we include YSDxDIST, an interaction between the distance to the nearest renewal 
area and the years since designation (YSD), allowing for the spatial trend to vary over 
time. Transactions in renewal areas and beyond the 500 m buffer are excluded from the 
sample. The results for both specifications are presented in Table A10. As all relevant coef-
ficients are insignificant, we conclude that that is no significant change in the spatial trend, 
neither directly after designation, not gradually emerging over the years.  
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Tab A10. Spatio-temporal Trends 
Notes: DIST is the distance to the nearest renewal area. Standard errors in parentheses. * p < 0.1, ** p < 
0.05, *** p < 0.01.  
3.6  Sensitivity analysis and treatment heterogeneity 
Sensitivity analysis 
As argued in the main paper, having a large number of available treatment and control 
areas helps with the evaluation of place-based policies in quasi-experimental research 
designs because idiosyncratic year-area specific shocks are more likely to then cancel each 
other out within the groups of treatment and control areas. With its relatively large num-
ber of treated and potential control areas, our empirical setting not only allows for a rela-
tively precise estimation of the average treatment effect but also for an evaluation of the 
sensitivity of the results to the inclusion of smaller numbers of treatment and control are-
as. As summarized in the main paper, we replicate our preferred model using different 
combinations of 1, 2, 5, 10, 15, 20 and (all) 22 randomly drawn treatment and control are-
as.  
We run three types of experiments. First, we vary the number of treatment areas while 
using all control areas for comparison. Second, we vary the number of control areas while 
using all treatment areas. Third, we vary the number of treatment and control areas simul-
taneously. Naturally, the specification where we draw 22 treatment and 22 control areas 
corresponds to the benchmark model presented in Table 1 in the main paper. Where a 
limited number of total combinations exist (e.g., 1x22 treatment areas vs. all control areas 
or 22x21 combinations of 2 treatment areas vs. all control areas), we estimate the model 
for all possible combinations. Where the number of possible combinations is very large, 
we estimate, for any given combination of numbers of treated and control areas, the 2,500 
version of the benchmark model with randomly drawn treatment and / or control areas. 
 (1)  (2)  
 log(price)  log(price)  
POSTxDIST 0.053 (0.149) -0.104 (0.199) 
YSDxDIST   0.015 (0.014) 
YSD   0.012 (0.029) 
DIST YES  YES  
Hedonic Controls YES  YES  
Location controls YES  YES  
Traffic Cell E. YES  YES  
Year Effects YES  YES  
Time-Varying E. YES  YES  
Observations 6,636  6,636  
R2 0.639  0.639  
AIC 10,345.4  10,343.2  
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Figure A4 displays the resulting distributions of the cumulated effect after 20 years sum-
marized in Table 3 in the main paper.  
In line with Table 4 in the main paper, Figure A4 reveals a large degree of variation in the 
point estimates in the models that consider only a small number of treatment and control 
areas. This finding is especially true for the models in which we select only few treatment 
and control areas. With only one randomly selected treatment (control) area compared to 
all control (treatment) areas, there is no apparent clustering of the point estimates, indi-
cating a significant degree of area specific shocks and / or heterogeneity for the policy 
effect across the treated areas (upper left). With two randomly drawn treatment or con-
trol areas, the distribution of the probability of obtaining a point estimate near to the av-
erage treatment effect significantly increases even though only a small proportion of the 
estimates falls within two standard error lengths of the benchmark estimate (upper right). 
With five treatment or control groups there is a relatively well-behaved probability distri-
bution centered around the average treatment effect, with the majority of individual esti-
mates being within two standard error lengths (middle left). Not surprisingly, the varia-
tion is further reduced as more areas are considered.  
When treatment and control areas are randomly drawn simultaneously, the probability 
distributions start to exhibit a reasonable shape once at least five treatment and control 
areas are considered (bottom left), although the results still show a remarkable degree of 
variation across the iterations. The variation decreases substantially as the number of 
treatment and control areas is increased. With fifteen treatment and control areas, the 
mean of the point estimates is very close to the benchmark model (using all 22 treatment 
and 22 control areas). Also, the standard deviation of the estimates is very close to the 
standard error estimated in the benchmark model.  
We conclude that the reliability for the estimate of the impact of place-based policies criti-
cally depends on the number of treatment and control areas available. Our results suggest 
that the stability of the results increases sharply once at least five treatment and five con-
trol areas are available.  
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Fig. A4. Evaluation of treatment heterogeneity 
Separately varying treatment & control groups 
1 random area selected  
 
2 random areas selected 
 
  
5 random areas selected  15 random areas selected 
  
Simultaneously varying treatment & control groups 
5 random areas selected 15 random areas selected  
  
Notes: In the upper two rows, black (red) solid lines depict the kernel density of cumulated effects when 
varying the number of renewal (investigation) areas. The black vertical lines depict the cumulated 
effect of our benchmark model (solid) plus/minus two standard error lengths (dashed). 
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Treatment heterogeneity 
In the main paper, we focus on estimating the average policy effect across all treated re-
newal areas, which strengthens the identification by using all available information. As we 
observe transactions in at various distances to the CBD, at locations with significantly dif-
ferent amenity endowments, and in different city districts, we can use the available varia-
tion to credibly control for temporal trends that are correlated with these characteristics. 
At the same time, Figure A4 (upper left, black solid line) reveals a large degree of treat-
ment heterogeneity across renewal areas. It should be noted that the variability of the 
results may be amplified by the relatively demanding specification, which may be particu-
larly sensitive to reductions in the degrees of freedom. 
Our recommended estimates for treatment effects by renewal area use a less demanding 
specification. To save degrees of freedom, we do not estimate our parametric treatment 
function from the main paper, but the difference in the (adjusted) average price level be-
fore designation and after 15 years, which is roughly the average runtime of the renewal 
areas. Dropping all transactions occurring within the first 15 years after designation, we 
estimate the long-run effect of designation using a simplified version of the benchmark 
model that omits the trend interaction effect. We compare the transactions in each renew-
al area separately against a specific control group, all transactions within a 500 to 3000 
meter buffer area around the renewal area. Transactions in other renewal areas and in a 
500 m buffer around other renewal areas are excluded from a renewal area specific con-
trol group. We control for time varying effects with respect to distance to CBD (interacted 
with the post treatment indicator) and the amenity density (interacted with the post 
treatment indicator). We also include the typical area floor space index, the unemploy-
ment rate, and the share of foreigners as covariates. The individual treatment results from 
the separate regressions by renewal area are summarized in Table A11.  
Despite the modifications we recommend that the individual estimates be interpreted 
with care due to the relatively small number of observations in some cases and the argua-
bly less comprehensive control for patio-temporal trends. Any apparent pattern will there-
fore only provide a tentative indication of the determinants that drive treatment hetero-
geneity. Overall, the estimates suggest a significant degree of treatment heterogeneity, 
which appears worth being investigated in more detail in future research. Potential 
sources of this heterogeneity include area-specific, heterogeneous policy targets that (lo-
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cal) decision makers, principal agents, and inhabitants agreed on,2 the ratio of renovated 
houses in the area, impacts of improvements like traffic calmings, (re)construction of 
playgrounds and parks, greenings, and establishment of local community centers (poten-
tially depending on religious affiliations). Finally the significantly positive appreciation 
rates may also reflect a tendency toward gentrification that is unrelated to the policy and 
has not been captured by the time-varying effects of distance to the CBD and amenity den-
sity.  
Tab A11.Area specific effects 
 
 Cumulated % change (Cumulated log-level trans-
formed effect on prices after 15 years)    
Area Name 
Cumulated 
% change 
Average 
appr. 
rate Coefficient 
Standard 
error P value t-stat 
Sub-sample 
size 
 Internal effects 
1 Helmholtzplatz 40.32% 2.28% 0.339 0.372 0.369 0.909 521 
2 Spandauer Vorstadt 121.36% 5.44% 0.795*** 0.160 0.000 4.968 609 
3 Kollwitzplatz 74.84% 3.79% 0.559*** 0.201 0.008 2.773 588 
4 Samariterviertel -11.96% -0.85% -0.127 0.253 0.618 -0.504 483 
5 Altstadt Kiez Vorstadt -12.70% -0.90% -0.136 0.097 0.187 -1.407 603 
6 Niederschöneweide -55.24% -5.22% -0.804*** 0.163 0.000 -4.918 503 
7 Teutoburger Platz 81.80% 4.07% 0.598 0.478 0.219 1.250 584 
8 Winsstrasse 56.27% 3.02% 0.446*** 0.160 0.008 2.796 414 
9 Warschauer Strasse 2.40% 0.16% 0.024 0.219 0.915 0.108 548 
10 Komponistenviertel 0.12% 0.01% 0.001 0.201 0.995 0.006 552 
11 Traveplatz Ostkreuz 44.00% 2.46% 0.365** 0.146 0.018 2.503 484 
12 Wollankstrasse 27.09% 1.61% 0.240* 0.131 0.079 1.826 709 
13 Beusselstrasse -27.12% -2.09% -0.316** 0.117 0.012 -2.704 453 
14 Rosenthaler Vorstadt 359.54% 10.70% 1.525*** 0.277 0.000 5.501 575 
15 Kaskelstrasse 3.97% 0.26% 0.039 0.108 0.721 0.362 413 
16 Weitlingstrasse -17.77% -1.30% -0.196 0.116 0.104 -1.680 462 
17 Wederstrasse -40.02% -3.35% -0.511* 0.264 0.066 -1.934 591 
18 Boetzowstrasse 25.81% 1.54% 0.230* 0.130 0.088 1.766 374 
19 Oberschöneweide -6.49% -0.45% -0.067 0.224 0.767 -0.300 546 
20 Stephankiez 23.58% 1.42% 0.212** 0.091 0.026 2.340 477 
Notes: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimates refer to the conditional difference in mean prices before 
and 15 years after designation. The last column displays the number of observations included in 
each regression, including the treatment and control group. Due to only a relatively small number 
of observations we omit the results for the two renewal areas Soldiner Strasse and Kottbusser 
Damm Ost. 
                                                             
2  Note that the rate of home-owners may differ from area to area. On the impact of differing home-
ownership rates on the process of political decision making see Fischl (2001) and Ahlfeldt and 
Maennig (Ahlfeldt & Maennig, 2013). 
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3.7 Aggregated impact (back of the envelope) 
To perform a back on the envelope calculation of the effectiveness of renewal policies, we 
draw on Table 1 in the main paper. Column 3 may be regarded as an upper bound because 
it imposes the strong assumption that, in the absence of policy treatment, the investigated 
areas would have followed exactly the same trend as the treated areas. By this assumption, 
we e.g. disregard potential “picking the winners”-effects by policy makers. Column 5 may 
be regarded as the lower bound because it allows for heterogeneous trends with respect 
to selected location characteristics. It provides an underestimate of the total effect if the 
changes in the perceived value of the determinants, which we regard as exogenous, are 
caused by the renewal policy. In each case, the policy effect is reflective of both an increase 
in property value due to an upgrade of the internal structure of an individual property and 
potential housing externalities arising from the mutual dependencies across properties. 
Our estimates can form the basis for a simple back of the envelope calculation of the total 
increase in property value caused by the policy, which is simply the total 2012 property 
value in the renewal areas multiplied by the percentage figure that is attributable to the 
policy according to our estimates. Table A12 provides the results which suggest that, for 
each of the €1.8 bill. invested, approximately €0.35-€1.8 are generated in terms of proper-
ty value, where – notably – the lower bound is not based on an estimate that is not signifi-
cantly different from zero. The non-educated mean of the two values is close to one – pub-
lic investments cause a simple rent shift from taxpayers to some individuals with no wel-
fare gain. The simple calculations reinforce our skepticism regarding the multiplier effects 
that operate through housing externalities caused by the policy in Berlin. 
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Tab A12.Back of the envelope calculation 
Area Name Average price Properties Property value 
1 Helmholtzplatz 1445110 560 € 809,261,600.00 
2 Spandauer Vorstadt 3279287 632 € 2,072,509,384.00 
3 Kollwitzplatz 1917316 476 € 912,642,416.00 
4 Samariterviertel 1118928 263 € 294,278,064.00 
5 Altstadt Kiez Vorstadt 865380.4 225 € 194,710,590.00 
6 Niederschöneweide 625492.2 97 € 60,672,743.40 
7 Teutoburger Platz 1426790 316 € 450,865,640.00 
8 Winsstrasse 1806810 219 € 395,691,390.00 
9 Warschauer Strasse 1239994 227 € 281,478,638.00 
10 Komponistenviertel 859561.3 477 € 410,010,740.10 
11 Traveplatz Ostkreuz 1513061 204 € 308,664,444.00 
12 Wollankstrasse 1190595 338 € 402,421,110.00 
13 Beusselstrasse 1733452 93 € 161,211,036.00 
14 Rosenthaler Vorstadt 1131136 373 € 421,913,728.00 
15 Kaskelstrasse 528402.7 248 € 131,043,869.60 
16 Weitlingstrasse 1370382 331 € 453,596,442.00 
17 Wederstrasse 508517.7 233 € 118,484,624.10 
18 Boetzowstrasse 1314302 191 € 251,031,682.00 
19 Oberschöneweide 719929.4 255 € 183,581,997.00 
20 Soldiner Strasse 1239714 11 € 13,636,854.00 
21 Kottbusser Damm Ost 2021468 21 € 42,450,828.00 
22 Stephankiez 812702.8 54 € 43,885,951.20 
Total value: € 8,414,043,771.40 
Lower bound impact estimate (7.33%, Table 1, model (5) € 652,929,796.66 
Upper bound impact estimate (49.79%, Table 1, model 3a) €3,414,418,962.43 
Notes: The employed transaction prices are in 2012 Euros. 
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